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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. E. A. CREDIT UNION, / 
Plaintiff and / 
Respondent, 
/ 
vs. Case No. 14561 
/ 
PAULA PACE, 
/ 
Defendant and 
Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action brought by the Respondent, who was 
the Plaintiff in the Lower Court on an Order To Show Cause, why 
the Court should not order the Appellant, who was the Defendant 
in the Lower Court, to deliver up to the Respondent property 
upon which the Respondent claimed to have a lien upon a secured 
transaction entered into which pledged security was allegedly 
signed by both the Appellant and her spouse. The present 
Complaint and Order To Show Cause before the Court being an 
action against the Appellant only and did not have joined with 
it the spouse of the Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court did grant to the Respondent the right 
to possession of the home furnishings of the Appellant without 
having joined in said cause of action the husband of the Appellant 
and without the granting of an opportunity to the Appellant 
to post surety or bond for continued possession of the furnish-
ings of the home and without granting to Appellant the right 
of a Due Process trial* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the granting by the 
Lower Court of an Order on Order To Show Cause, granting to 
the Respondent a right to immediate possession of the home 
furnishings of the Appellant/ utilizing the contempt powers 
of a Lower District Court granting possession of the property 
of the Appellant to the Respondent prior to the right of a 
Due Process hearing and adjudication of the rights of the husband# 
who was not a party in the Lower Court/ in affect, granting 
an action of replevin prior to adjudication and Judgment of 
a Due Process hearing and without opportunity to the Appellant 
for the posting of a bond and in any way protecting the property 
rights of the Appellant and her spouse prior to seizure by 
a Sheriff in Weber County under orders of the Lower Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant and her spouse, Rudolph Pace, entered 
into a Promissory Note and Security Agreement with the Respondent 
on April 9, 1974. (R-19). The Respondent brought suit against 
the Appellant only, not naming the husband of the Appellant 
in the Lower Court Complaint* (R-1) 
The Respondent brought an Order to Show Cause seeking 
Summary Replevin of the home furnishings which was the property 
of both thfe Appellant and her husband. (R-33) 
An Order was signed and issued by the Lower Court on 
April 1, 1976, directing the Sheriff of Weber County to take 
possession of the security, which was the property of both 
the Appellant and her husband, Rudolph Pace. Only the wife, 
namely the Appellant herein, was a party to the action in the 
Lower Court (R-31). The Writ of Replevin was issued on April 1/ 
1976, by the Clerk of the Lower Court, together with a Precipe 
for possession of the merchandise of the Appellant and her 
spouse, Rudolph Pace (R-32). The Court issued the Writ of 
Replevin prior to trial and without necessity of the posting 
of bond as required under Rule 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as amended 1953. (R-33) 
The spouse of the Appellant had previously filed Bankruptcy 
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
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Northern Division, on October 5, 1974, and was discharged in 
Bankruptcy on November 3, 1975, (JR-14) . The Respondent herein 
was a creditor scheduled in the Bankruptcy schedules of Rudolph 
Pace (R-14). 
The manager and treasurer of the Respondent testified 
that the Security Agreement was in fact signed by the Appellant 
and her spouse, Rudolph Pace CR-44), and further testified 
that the Respondent knew of the Bankruptcy filed by the Appellant's 
spouse, Rudolph Pace; that inasmuch as the Respondent's filing 
"was invalid", no claim nor any attempt to obtain a Disclaimer, 
or to file an action for fraud, or any other legal action was 
taken by the Respondent in the Bankruptcy Court. The Respondent's 
witness further testified that the Appellant herein was released 
from the first Security Agreement and that the items that were 
on the first Security Agreement were added to the items which 
were evidenced in the second Agreement, and that the second 
Agreement was a re-write of the first Agreement and was written 
so that the security of Rudolph Pace could be added into the 
successive instrument, which was a secured instrument upon 
which the Respondent herein brought its action in the Lower 
Court. (R-46) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HUSBAND CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF HIS ESTATE WITHOUT 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Rudolph S. Pace is the husband of the Appellant in the 
instant matter before this Court and was not a party-Defendant 
to the action in the Lower Court/ and he will be referred to 
hereinafter as the "husband". 
The Legislature of Utahr in whom the Constitution vests 
the exclusive right to enact law, has formerly declared in 
Section 68-3-1/ Utah Code Annotated/ as amended 1953/ that: 
The Common Law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to or in conflict with the Constitution 
or laws of the United States/ or the Constitution 
or laws of this State *** is hereby adopted/ and 
shall be the rule of decision in all Courts of 
this State. (Emphasis supplied) 
The Utah Supreme Court/ in applying a substantially 
identical Wyoming Statute declared that "the Common Law of 
England" so referred to refers to that law as of the date of 
the Declaration of Independence on July 4/ 1776. Johnson v. 
Union Pacific Coal Company/ 28 Ut. 146; 76 P. 1089/ 1091 to 
1093. 
There isf of course/ nothing in the Utah Constitution 
or Statutes repugnant to an estate by the entirety, and an 
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estate by the entirety which includes the personal property 
of a husband and wife, existed under the Common Law and has 
been recognized in various statutes of the State of Utah as 
still an existing entity. 
78-41-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1953, in 
making reference to possible Estates existing in the State 
of Utah, specifically refers to a tenancy by the entirety as 
a possible Estate which would be affected by the termination 
of a life estate in reference therein. 
In setting forth the rules for determining the existence 
of a partnership and to the type of estates that may exist 
thereunder, the statutes state at 48-1-4(2), Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended in 1953, the affect of particular statutes as to 
a tenancy by the entireties. 
The alleged secured agreement under which the Respondent 
sought and obtained a Writ of Replevin in the Lower Court, as 
attached to Plaintiff's Complaint (R-2), was signed by both the 
Appellant and the husband, and was a re-write of a Security 
Agreement entered into November 1, 1973, which was an instrument 
drafted prior to the one upon which the Writ of Replevin was based 
(R-46), and in accordance with the testimony of the Respondent's 
only witness, was subscribed to by both the Appellant and her 
husband in order to release the furniture as collateral on the 
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first loan and adding in the items set forth in the second 
secured agreement, plus a substantial additional amount of 
the home furnishings of the husband, was intended as a release 
of the furniture as collateral on the first loan as testified 
to by Respondent's witness (R-46). 
The husband had previous to any prior action filed a 
Petition in Bankruptcy and had been discharged at the time 
of the action in the Lower Court (R-14). The Respondent testified 
that it did not file a claim nor seek to sustain its lien in 
the Bankruptcy Court as against the husband, in that: 
I discovered at the hearing in Bankruptcy, that 
another finance company had a prior lien on the 
subject furniture and that our filing was invalid. 
(R-45) 
There was, therefore, no claim of any kind made before 
the Bankruptcy Court, either in allegation of a valid lien 
as to the Respondent or her spouse nor an allegation as to 
any fraud on the part of the husband or in regards to the alleged 
secured loan held by the Respondent, wherein the household 
furnishings of the Appellant and her husband was supposedly 
security for a loan, in that the Respondent believed it could 
not maintain a valid action of any kind in the Bankruptcy Court, 
and, therefore, avoided any confrontation as to its allegations 
of a secured loan or security at the time of the filing of 
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a Petition in Bankruptcy by the husband. (R-45) 
There was no transfer of any estate as between the husband 
and wife and the estate of the husband and wife was an estate 
wherein each of the parties had an interest in the whole of 
the tenancy and common ownership in their household furnishings 
and was in the nature of an estate in personalty by the entirety. 
A Common Law conveyance of property required a transfer 
of title and the granting of the lien against the personal 
property of the Appellant and her husband by reason of a secured 
transaction created in the Respondent at most an "equitable" 
or "lien" upon said property. Title to the property remained 
in the lienors and not in the Respondent. 
The State of Utah has consistently held in regards to 
real property mortgages/ that Utah is an "equitable" or "lien 
theory" State and not that of a "title theory". (See Thompson 
v. Cheasman, 15 Ut. 43, 48 P. 477; Bybee v. Stuart, 159 P.2d 
118 (1948). 
At 27 A.L.R. 826, definition of a marital estate and 
the nature of it is set forth as follows: 
An estate of the entirety exists only between 
husband and wife, being an outgrowth of the 
marital relation based upon the theory of the 
legal unity of the two; it is, however, a unit 
of indivisible parts vesting in two distinct 
persons (husband and wifel, who are, however, 
-8-
regarded in law as one and the same. In this 
regard, the estate differs from a joint tenancy. 
Because of the indivisibility of the estate and 
the fact that it vests absolutely in the survivor, 
a very serious question has been presented as to 
whether or not any portion of the estate may be 
subjected to the payment of the individual debts 
of one of the spouses. 
An estate by the entirety is a form of co-ownership in 
real and personal property held by husband and wife with right 
of survivorship. Its essential characteristic is that each 
spouse is seized per tout et non per my; that is of the whole 
or one of the entirety and not of a share, moiety, or divisible 
part as was defined in Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 A. 
494; C.I.T. Corporation v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the act of the Respondent 
in bringing an action against the Appellant only, without including 
the husband in said action, could not destroy the interest 
of the husband in the household furnishings and no possession 
of the collateral of the property, which was the property as 
much that of the husband as of the Appellant, could be achieved 
and perfected without the husband being a party to such action. 
It was held in Louis Licker, et ux, v. Gluskin, 164 
N.E. 613, by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that 
the Common Law rights and disabilities of both husband and 
wife attach to the interest and title of each arising under 
-9-
a tenancy by the entirety, and that the tenancy of the husband 
and wife in the entirety is essentially a tenancy modified 
by the Common Law theory of unity of husband and wife, in that 
they do not take by moieties, but by entireties. The Court 
further held that the characteristic of a tenancy by the entireties 
at Common Law continues unaffected by the modern statutes designed 
to ameliorate the rights of married women at Common Law and 
to render more flexible and individual the property rights 
of husband and'wife. The Court further held: 
That these indubitable Common Law rules require 
the conclusion, that a creditor cannot do with 
the right of a tenant by the entirety that 
which the tenant cannot do. 
POINT II 
THE RIGHT OF THE BANKRUPT'S SPOUSE IS PROTECTED 
BY THE SUPREMACY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OVER THE 
LAWS OF A STATE. 
The Bankruptcy Act was created by Congress and the Bankruptcy 
Act specifically sets forth in 11 U.S.C., Section 11, jurisdiction 
and creation of Courts of Bankruptcy by stating: 
The Courts of the United States hereinbefore defined 
as Courts of Bankruptcy are hereby created Courts of 
Bankruptcy and are hereby invested, within their 
respective territorial limits as now established, or 
as they may be hereafter changed, with such jurisdic-
tion at law and in equity as will enable them to 
exercise original jurisdiction and proceedings under 
this Act, in vacation, in chambers, and during the 
respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter 
held, to -
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It is necessary and should be emphasized that the power 
to determine dischargeability of a particular claim upon the 
application of a Bankrupt in the exceptional case, presently 
resides in the Bankruptcy Court by virtue of a decision of 
the Supreme Court in Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). 
The adoption of Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act as 
reported by the National Bankruptcy Conference, wherein it 
stated: 
One of the strongest arguments in support of the Bill 
is, that if the Bill is passed, a single Court, to-wit: 
the Bankruptcy Court, will be able to pass upon the 
question of dischargeability of a particular claim 
and it will be able to develop an expertise in 
resolving the problem in particular cases. The State 
Courts1 Judges, however capable they may be, do not 
have enough cases to acquire sufficient experience to 
enable them to develop this expertise. Moreover, 
even under the present system in the last analysis, 
it is the United States Supreme Court, which has the 
ultimate word on the construction of Section 17 of 
the Bankruptcy Act. Section 17 makes provisions for 
the debts to be released by discharge and those which 
shall be excluded from a discharge. Since this is 
a Federal Statute, the Federal Courts necessarily 
have the final word as to the meaning of any terms 
contained therein. 
The United States Constitution in Article VI, Clause 
2, provides that: 
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof *** shall 
be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in 
the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding" is the basic roots wherein the 
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Doctrine of Federal Pre-emption takes its roots and 
the Bankruptcy Act is such a pre-emptive Act as is 
binding upon all States. 
The listing of the Respondent herein by the Appellantfs 
spouse in his Bankruptcy schedule (R-14) gave to the Respondent 
every opportunity to prove its right of title to the security 
which it claimed and sets forth in its Complaint in the Lower 
Court, and if in fact there was fraud on the part of the Bankrupt 
in the Lower Court as to the financing and securing of the 
home furnishings to the Respondent, the Respondent had not 
only the opportunity, but the right to have its claim adjudicated 
in the Federal Bankruptcy Court and to assert the Respondent's 
right or entitle to the collateral which it now claims. 
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 Fed.Rpt.2d 764 (Cir.Ct. of 
Appeals, 4th Cir., 1931), the Court held that there is ample 
authority for the proposition that where property is not reachable 
through Bankruptcy, it can be reached by a creditor under State 
laws, the Court of Bankruptcy should delay a granting a discharge 
to the Bankrupt to enable the creditor to receive thereunder 
in the State Courts. (Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 
294, 23 Sup.Ct. 751.) The Respondent could, therefore, have 
prevented the right of the Respondent being precluded from 
further action in the State Court by an adjudication of the 
Bankruptcy Court, that the husband would be an essential party, 
together with the wife, in an action to seek property held 
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by the entirety or as tenants in common, thereby .preserving 
the purported claim of the Respondent before trial in the State 
Court by an adjudication in the Bankruptcy Court or in the 
Second District Court protecting the Respondent and its alleged 
interest in the home furnishings of the parties. In the prior 
case, supra, the Court held as a matter of law, that the failure 
of the secured party to join both the husband and wife in a 
state action, prior to one of the spouses being discharged 
in Bankruptcy, estopped further state action, in that neither 
spouse can dispose of any part of the property without the 
consent of the other and neither has such an interest in the 
property as can be subjected to the lien of a Judgment for 
his debts or as can be levied upon and sold under legal process 
against the parties. 
Ades v. Catlan, et ux, 132 Md. 66, 103 At. 94, action 
wherein the husband and wife were tenants by the entirety and 
wherein the husband was a Petitioner in Bankruptcy and was 
discharged from the indebtedness as against him. A creditor 
attempt to levy upon the property interest of the wife in the 
tenancy by the entirety, the Bankruptcy Court held an estate 
of the wife could not be reached during the lifetime of the 
husband, that there could be no severance of the estate. 
Wharton v. Citizens Bank, 223 Mo.App. 236, 15 S.W. 860, 
(1929) , the Court held that where Judgment was obtained against 
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the wife only, after the discharge of a husband in his voluntary 
Bankrupt proceedings on a Note signed by both husband and wife, 
it was held that the lands held by the husband and wife as 
tenants by the entireties could not/ to any extent/ be subjected 
to the payment of the Judgment against the wife during the 
lifetime of the husband/ where the creditor made no attempt 
to procure a stay of the husband's discharge in Bankruptcy for 
a time sufficient to enable him to subject the property to 
his claim. The Court stated: 
**If the Appellant had made application to the 
Federal Court for permission to bring suit against 
the Bankrupt for the purpose of subjecting the 
estate by the entirety to the satisfaction of the 
joint debt and for a stay of proceedings upon 
the application for discharge until that suit 
could proceed to Judgment/ the permission would 
have been granted and the Discharge would have 
been withheld. Then it could have obtained a 
joint Judgment, which would have been a lien 
upon the real estate held by the husband and wife 
as tenants by the entirety. **The husband filed 
his Petition in Voluntary Bankruptcy, that did 
not prevent Appellant from proceeding to assert 
its right, but has lost its right by default. 
The Respondent in its Legal Memorandum to the Lower 
Court attempted to allege the superiority of Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in the instant matter before the Court/ 
upon which a view has been expressed by Professor William E. 
Hogan in Volume 17f Standford Law Review/ page 840, on "Future 
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Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors", as follows: 
At each turn, the Code attempts to improve the 
position of the secured creditor as against the 
unsecured creditors and the Trustee in Bankruptcy. 
This is a sterile undertaking, because the avoiding 
powers provided by the Bankruptcy Act under the 
Federal Supremacy clause will prevail over the State 
created rights of the Article 9 creditor.*** 
In the Matter of Fred Gilmer Saunders, Jr., Bankrupt, 
No. 73-BK-20-R, 365 F.Supp. 1351, (U.S. Dist. Ct., Western 
District, Virginia, 1973), the Court held that, under the laws 
of the State of Virginia, property held by the entirety is 
not subject to the claims of individual creditors of one of 
the tenants; nor can either spouse acting alone transfer an 
interest in the property. The Court held, however, that the 
Petitioner in this case was the holder of Notes signed by both 
the Bankrupt and his wife, could reach the property held as 
a tenancy by the entirety were it not for the intervening Bankruptcy, 
and that since the property was not subject to transfer, released 
the husband from all provable debts and prevents the Petitioner 
from obtaining a Judgment against the Bankrupt and his wife 
on the Notes. 
The Court further stated, that this result could be 
avoided if the Petitioner were able to secure and record a 
Judgment against the Bankrupt and his wife, since this would 
create a lien against the property which would not be affected 
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by a subsequent discharge. The Referee ordered, that the discharge 
of the Bankrupt be delayed in order that the Petitioner could 
proceed against the entirety property in State Court. 
The Court/ therefore, upheld the decision of the Referee 
in allowing the Bankruptcy to be held up until there was a 
completed state action as against the husband and wife. 
It is, therefore, submitted to the Court that the Respondent 
by failing to pursue its right to seek remedy in the Bankruptcy 
Court as against the Bankrupt-spouse of the Appellant prevents 
the Respondent from asserting its right against the entirety 
interest of the Appellant and her spouse in the action adjudicated 
by the Lower Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the 
Respondent had not only the opportunity but a duty to proceed 
with its claim against the interest of the husband of the 
Appellant in the Bankruptcy Court when the Respondent had full 
knowledge of the listing of its indebtedness in the schedule 
of the Bankrupt, and that the contention of the Respondent, 
that it did not proceed in the Bankruptcy Court to establish 
Respondent's claim as to the property of the husband, in that 
the Respondent's claim was "invalid" as against the husband 
should not allow the destruction of the estate of the husband 
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and wife in their personal property. It is further submitted/ 
that the discharge in Bankruptcy of the husband and the filing 
of an action in Replevin against the wife only for possession 
of the family rights of the tenancy in the household furnishings 
of a husband and wife is contradictory to the "fresh start" 
theory propounded by innumerable United States Supreme Court 
decisions in establishing the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act 
and is contrary to the laws of the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS of VLAHOS & KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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